Стрельба в Кракове: почему Польша должна ужесточить контроль над владельцами оружия

Legal analysis of the events in Kraków on 7 november 2026

Current developments. On 7 November 2026, at approximately 3:00 p.m., a 24-year-old man opened fire on pedestrians and a tram in Kraków’s Main Market Square and the adjoining streets. Six people were killed and 15–16 were injured, including two police officers1. The attacker was wounded and apprehended; on 9 November, he died in hospital2. The shots were not fired by a criminal using an illegally obtained firearm, but by a person who had lawfully obtained a sports-shooting firearms licence in March 20263. The central issue, therefore, concerns the firearms licensing system. The Ministry of the Interior and Administration announced a review of the procedures governing access to firearms4. More far-reaching proposals have also emerged in public debate: extending the powers of the security services along the lines of the Patriot Act, equipping the police with automatic firearms, increasing officers’ remuneration, and broadening citizens’ right to defend themselves with firearms.

The firearms licensing system has been examined in Polish legal scholarship by K. Chałupka5 and K. Jakubiak6. The limits on police use of firearms have been analysed by M. Ilnicki7 and K. Jałoszyński, who wrote in 2012 about the lack of precision surrounding the concept of a “rescue shot”8. The constituent elements of terrorist offences have been considered by K. Burdziak9. In the Netherlands, scholars have discussed state liability for damage caused by a person who obtained a firearms licence unlawfully10. I have not, however, found a comprehensive legal assessment of a shooting perpetrated by a lawful firearms licence holder that takes account of EU law and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter: the ECtHR). The investigation is ongoing, and the facts may yet be clarified.

The purpose of this study is to assess the legality of the actions of the attacker, the police officers and the Polish public authorities, and to determine which of the proposed measures could prevent similar offences while remaining within constitutional and Convention standards. The starting premise is that the events in Kraków exposed shortcomings in the preventive oversight of lawful firearms holders, rather than a lack of powers available to law-enforcement officers. Measures strengthening that oversight are therefore the most likely to be effective.

1. The prosecution classified the events in Kraków under Article 148 § 3 in conjunction with Article 115 § 20 of the Criminal Code (hereinafter: the CC)11, and the killing of three people in Ostrowiec Świętokrzyski, which was linked to the attacker, under Article 148 § 3 CC12. The first part of this legal classification raises no doubts: Article 148 § 3 covers the killing of several people by a single act.

The terrorist element presents a more complex issue. Under Article 115 § 20 CC, a terrorist offence is a prohibited act punishable by imprisonment with a maximum term of at least five years, committed with the aim of “seriously intimidating many persons”, compelling a public authority to take or refrain from taking a particular action, or causing serious disruption to the constitutional system or the economy of the state. K. Burdziak rightly observes that the presence of any one of these purposes is sufficient, and that the intended consequences need not actually occur13. The perpetrator’s motive is not decisive in this context. The attacker chose the city’s busiest square on a Saturday and fired at random people. Such conduct is calculated to intimidate everyone present in a public urban space and is consistent with the understanding of terrorism set out in Directive (EU) 2017/54114.

Polish courts have applied this provision, and the best-known case is also connected with Kraków. Brunon K. prepared an explosion near the Sejm building. The courts at both instances classified his acts as a terrorist offence; in 2017, the Court of Appeal sentenced him to nine years’ imprisonment, and the Supreme Court dismissed all cassation appeals as manifestly unfounded15.

The injuries inflicted on victims may be classified as attempted murder (Article 13 § 1 in conjunction with Article 148 § 3 CC), while firing at police officers may additionally constitute an active assault on a public official (Article 223 § 1 and Article 11 § 2 CC). The origin of the firearm must be established separately. A firearms licence specifies the purpose, type and number of firearms authorised (Article 12(1) of the Act on Weapons and Ammunition)16. Possession of a firearm not covered by the licence is subject to Article 263 § 2 CC. In 2020, the Supreme Court also held that possession of ammunition for a firearm other than the one specified in the licence constituted an offence17. A person who transferred the firearm to the attacker, despite being lawfully entitled to possess it, may incur liability under Article 263 § 3 CC.

2. The second issue requiring consideration is the lawfulness of the police officers’ actions.

It should be recalled that the current legal framework took shape following the Constitutional Tribunal’s judgment of 17 May 2012, in which the delegation of matters concerning direct coercive measures to subordinate legislation was held unconstitutional18. The following year, the Act on Direct Coercive Measures and Firearms was adopted (hereinafter: the DCMFA)19. The shots fired in Kraków had a legal basis in Article 45(1), (3) and (4) of that Act: repelling an attack on life, pursuing and apprehending a person suspected of committing offences under Articles 115 § 20 and 148 CC. The officers could dispense with the warning “Stop, or I will shoot!” and a warning shot because any delay would have endangered human life (Article 48(3)(1)).

At the same time, the Act requires officers to cause the least possible harm, exercise particular caution with regard to bystanders and use firearms only as a last resort (Article 7(1), (3) and (4) DCMFA). The courts apply these requirements rigorously. In January 2013, the Supreme Court quashed the acquittals of four police officers who had fired at a car. It held that firearms may be used only as a last resort, not as a “first reaction” and not without prior warning; the officers could have moved out of the vehicle’s path20. In the same month, the Warsaw Court of Appeal found unlawful a shot fired at a mentally ill man armed with a knife, because batons or other less dangerous measures had not been used21. Both judgments were delivered under the former Police Act, but the underlying principles have not materially changed since then22.

The patrol officers who were the first to engage in the exchange of fire could not rely on the “special use of firearms” under Article 23 of the Anti-Terrorism Activities Act (hereinafter: the ATAA)23, meaning a shot that may result in death. Such use is permitted only to a counter-terrorism unit, on the basis of a decision by the person directing the operation (Article 23(1), (4)–(6)). In 2016, the legislature addressed the issue of the “rescue shot” only in relation to special units. Consequently, during the first minutes of an “active shooter” attack, police officers operate under general rules designed for ordinary interventions. In my view, this constitutes a gap in the law.

The information currently available provides no grounds to doubt that the use of force was “absolutely necessary” within the meaning of Article 2(2) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter: the ECHR). The attacker nevertheless died in hospital. If his death was caused by police gunfire, the state is under an obligation to conduct an effective official investigation24.

3. I now turn to the actions of the public authorities. At the time of the attack, the BRAVO and BRAVO-CRP alert levels were in force in Poland (the Prime Minister’s order of 25 August 2026; Articles 15 and 16 ATAA), and patrols were equipped with long firearms25. No state of emergency was declared, and in my view rightly so: Article 228(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland permits the introduction of extraordinary measures only when ordinary constitutional measures prove insufficient26. In this case, they proved sufficient.

In my assessment, the key problem lies in the area of prevention. Several months before the attack, the Supreme Audit Office had identified deficiencies in the supervision of firearms holders and the incomplete implementation of EU directives27. Under Article 15(4) of the Act on Weapons and Ammunition, only holders of licences for personal protection and the protection of persons and property are required to undergo medical and psychological examinations every five years. Hunters, sport shooters and holders of training-purpose licences are examined only when applying for a licence28. Periodic examinations for hunters, introduced in 2018, were abolished in 202329. Article 6(2) of Directive (EU) 2021/555, however, requires monitoring throughout the entire period of validity of a firearms authorisation, including the assessment of relevant medical and psychological information30.

The Act provides grounds for revoking a firearms licence. The police are required to revoke it where the holder poses a threat to themselves, public order or public security (Article 18(1)(2) and Article 15(1)(6) of the Act on Weapons and Ammunition). In 2008, the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the revocation of a licence on the basis of the individual’s character traits31. The problem, therefore, is not the absence of legal provisions, but the absence of information. There is also a Convention dimension: in Kotilainen and Others v Finland, a case concerning the school shooting in Kauhajoki, the ECtHR derived from the high-risk nature of firearms an obligation of particular diligence and found a violation of Article 2 ECHR, even though the threat had not been directed at specific individuals32.

4. The experience of other states is also worth considering. Following the attacks of 13 November 2015, France introduced a state of emergency (état d’urgence) under the 1955 Act33. It remained in force until 1 November 2017, and some of its instruments were subsequently incorporated into the Internal Security Code by the SILT Act. Advocates of a “Polish Patriot Act” should remember how readily temporary measures can become permanent. At the same time, Article L. 435-1(5°) of the same Code permits police officers to fire in order to prevent the recurrence of murders or attempted murders committed moments earlier, where there are actual and objective grounds to consider such recurrence likely34. Polish law contains no equivalent provision.

Following the Antwerp shooting of 11 May 2006, in which a legally purchased shotgun was used, Belgium adopted a new firearms law as early as 8 June. The law required a licence and a legally recognised justification for acquiring a firearm35. Belgium responded differently to the terrorist attacks of 2016: the Act of 27 April 2016 expanded the possibility of interception in firearms-trafficking cases, authorised night-time searches and established a joint database on “foreign fighters”36.

After the 2011 shooting in Alphen aan den Rijn, committed by a shooting-club member with a history of psychiatric treatment, the Netherlands tightened the screening of applicants’ reliability. In 2019, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeal that the police were liable for the damage because they had unlawfully issued the shooter with a firearms licence37. Legal scholarship has already described this judgment as a “modern classic”38. In 2020, Germany introduced a mandatory inquiry to the domestic intelligence authorities as part of the reliability assessment of firearms holders (§ 5(5), sentence 1, no. 4 WaffG)39. These examples demonstrate that states have responded to threats posed by lawful firearms holders by tightening access controls and improving information-sharing between authorities.

5. I now turn to an assessment of the measures under consideration.

The first measure, tightening controls over firearms circulation, appears the most justified because it addresses the weakest link in the system. Five-yearly medical and psychological examinations should be extended to hunters, sport shooters and holders of training-purpose licences, as envisaged by the bill submitted to the Sejm (Print No. 1931). I propose that monitoring under Article 6(2) of Directive 2021/555—which permits both continuous and periodic monitoring—should be continuous, with information exchanged between the police, healthcare providers and the security services, following the German model. In respect of semi-automatic long firearms capable of firing more than 11 rounds without reloading (point 7(b) of Category A of Annex I to the Directive), the conditions set out in Article 9(6) should be applied consistently, and such authorisations should be reviewed at least once every five years (Article 9(7)). It is also worth considering narrowing the police’s discretion as to the number of firearms listed in a licence, an issue previously raised by K. Chałupka40.

6. Extending the powers of law-enforcement officers along the lines of the American Patriot Act gives rise to considerably greater reservations. Poland already has legislation of this kind: the 2016 Anti-Terrorism Activities Act, together with amendments to the Police Act, significantly expanded the powers of the security services. As early as 2014, the Constitutional Tribunal held unconstitutional the absence of independent oversight of the acquisition of telecommunications data41. The Commissioner for Human Rights has repeatedly emphasised that this judgment has not been implemented42. In Pietrzak and Bychawska-Siniarska and Others v Poland, the ECtHR found that the regimes governing operational surveillance, telecommunications data retention and covert observation under Article 9 ATAA violated Article 8 ECHR43. Any further expansion would therefore have to satisfy the proportionality requirement in Article 31(3) of the Constitution. In my view, only targeted amendments are justified: statutory regulation of information-sharing between the Internal Security Agency, the police and firearms licensing authorities, and a provision giving first responders a clear legal basis for action against an “active shooter”, subject to subsequent independent review.

7. Equipping the police with automatic firearms is formally possible, since the DCMFA does not specify the types of service firearms that may be used44. However, the requirements of Article 7 of that Act and the ECtHR standard concerning the planning and control of operations45 make automatic fire in a square or near a tram excessively risky. In Wasilewska and Kałucka v Poland, police officers fired at a car with an MP-5 submachine gun and in a burst from a Kalashnikov rifle; the ECtHR found a violation of Article 2 ECHR46. A more reasonable approach would be to equip patrols with semi-automatic carbines and train them for “active shooter” scenarios, while reserving automatic firearms for special units.

8. Increasing police remuneration may at first glance appear to have little to do with terrorism, but a connection does exist. As of 1 March 2026, the police had 9,630 vacancies, representing 8.7% of established posts47. The government’s 2026–2029 modernisation programme for the uniformed services, worth PLN 13 billion, provides for a 25% increase in remuneration48. Staffing levels and training determine how many patrols can be deployed near the scene of an attack and how well prepared they are. It is therefore logical to link additional remuneration to tactical training. Legal protection is also relevant: the Act of 12 July 2024 preserved full remuneration for a police officer suspended from duty in connection with proceedings concerning the use of firearms49. I support this measure as a supplementary one.

9. Broader rights for citizens to defend themselves using firearms. The argument that an armed citizen may stop an attacker earlier than the police should not be dismissed. Directive 2021/555 nevertheless permits the possession of firearms only where there is a good reason and provided that the person concerned does not pose a danger to themselves, others, public order or public security (Article 6(1)). In the case of a licence for personal protection, Polish law requires a “constant, real and above-average threat” (Article 10(3)(1) of the Act on Weapons and Ammunition), and the courts interpret this requirement narrowly50. The CC already guarantees the right to self-defence; moreover, exceeding its limits due to fear or agitation justified by the circumstances of the attack is not punishable (Article 25 § 1 and § 3). The dispute therefore concerns access to the instrument, not the existence of the right itself. Furthermore, the Kraków attacker himself possessed a firearm lawfully, and armed civilians in a crowd could make it more difficult for the police to identify the shooter. In the absence of convincing empirical evidence, I see no basis for liberalising access to firearms.

Conclusions. The classification of the attacker’s conduct as terrorist murder is justified, and his death does not release the state from the obligation to identify any accomplices and establish the sources of the firearm. On the information available, the police officers’ actions appear to have complied with the DCMFA and Article 2 ECHR, although they require an independent investigation. The tragedy also exposed a gap between the general regime governing the use of firearms and the “special use of firearms”, which is available exclusively to counter-terrorism units. The authorities acted using ordinary constitutional measures; however, the findings of the Supreme Audit Office, Article 6(2) of Directive 2021/555 and the standard established in Kotilainen demonstrate systemic deficiencies in the preventive oversight of lawful firearms holders.

Accordingly, priority should be given to measures in this area: periodic examinations and continuous monitoring of firearms holders, accompanied by information-sharing; stricter conditions for semi-automatic firearms; a provision for first responders modelled on French law; and adequate funding for the police. The Patriot Act model faces the constraints imposed by Article 31(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and Article 8 ECHR, while there are neither sufficient legal nor empirical grounds for liberalising access to firearms. In my view, the starting point should be the bill already submitted to the Sejm (Print No. 1931), supplemented with provisions governing continuous monitoring.

References

  1. ‘Strzelanina na Rynku Głównym w Krakowie. Są zabici i ranni’ (RMF24, 7 listopada 2026) https://www.rmf24.pl/regiony/krakow/news-strzelanina-na-rynku-glownym-w-krakowie-sa-zabici-i-ranni,nIdn,1025257 (accessed: 09.11.2026). ↩
  2. ‘Milion sztuk broni w rękach cywilów. Krakowska tragedia stawia pytania o system pozwoleń’ (Euronews, 9 listopada 2026) https://pl.euronews.com/2026/11/09/milion-sztuk-broni-w-rekach-cywilow-krakowska-tragedia-stawia-pytania-o-system-pozwolen (accessed: 09.11.2026). ↩
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  5. K Chałupka, ‘Pozwolenie na posiadanie broni palnej – uwagi de lege lata i de lege ferenda’ (2014) 32 Nowa Kodyfikacja Prawa Karnego 103, 105. ↩
  6. K Jakubiak, ‘Materialne przesłanki wydania pozwolenia na broń do celów ochrony osobistej’ (2025) 2 Policja 19. ↩
  7. M Ilnicki, ‘Użycie broni palnej jako szczególna forma egzekwowania przestrzegania prawa w pokojowych warunkach funkcjonowania państwa’ (2020) 4(140) Przegląd Policyjny 59, 61. ↩
  8. K Jałoszyński, ‘Strzał ratunkowy – rozwiązanie sytuacji zakładniczej w działaniach policyjnych’ (2012) 10 Kultura Bezpieczeństwa. Nauka – Praktyka – Refleksje 31. ↩
  9. K Burdziak, Definicja przestępstwa o charakterze terrorystycznym przewidziana w polskim Kodeksie karnym w świetle rozwiązań Unii Europejskiej, Rady Europy i Organizacji Narodów Zjednoczonych. Raport z projektu badawczego (Instytut Wymiaru Sprawiedliwości 2021) 7 https://iws.gov.pl/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/IWS_Burdziak-K._Definicja-przestępstwa-o-charakterze-terrorystycznym….pdf (accessed: 09.11.2026). ↩
  10. DA van der Kooij, ‘Toerekening van schade na “Groningen” en “Alphen aan den Rijn”’ (2021) 2 Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Burgerlijk Recht 54. ↩
  11. Ustawa z dnia 6 czerwca 1997 r. – Kodeks karny (Dz.U. 1997 nr 88 poz. 553 ze zm.). ↩
  12. ‘Rusza śledztwo w sprawie ataku w Krakowie’ (Interia, 2026) https://wydarzenia.interia.pl/malopolskie/news-rusza-sledztwo-w-sprawie-ataku-w-krakowie-minister-sprawiedl,nId,23570723 (accessed: 09.11.2026). ↩
  13. Burdziak (przyp. 9) 7. ↩
  14. Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism [2017] OJ L88/6, arts 3(1)(a), 3(2)(a). ↩
  15. Postanowienie Sądu Najwyższego z dnia 17 kwietnia 2018 r., IV KK 102/18 https://www.sn.pl/sites/orzecznictwo/OrzeczeniaHTML/iv%20kk%20102-18.docx.html (accessed: 10.11.2026). ↩
  16. Ustawa z dnia 21 maja 1999 r. o broni i amunicji (t.j. Dz.U. 2024 poz. 485 ze zm.). ↩
  17. Wyrok Sądu Najwyższego z dnia 16 grudnia 2020 r., IV KK 420/19. ↩
  18. Wyrok Trybunału Konstytucyjnego z dnia 17 maja 2012 r., K 10/11, OTK-A 2012, nr 5, poz. 51. ↩
  19. Ustawa z dnia 24 maja 2013 r. o środkach przymusu bezpośredniego i broni palnej (t.j. Dz.U. 2024 poz. 383). ↩
  20. Wyrok Sądu Najwyższego z dnia 17 stycznia 2013 r., V KK 99/12; zob.: ‘Użycie broni palnej przez Policję’ (Infor.pl) https://www.infor.pl/prawo/prawo-karne/policja/316840,Uzycie-broni-palnej-przez-Policje.html (accessed: 09.11.2026). ↩
  21. Wyrok Sądu Apelacyjnego w Warszawie z dnia 25 stycznia 2013 r., II AKa 7/13. ↩
  22. J Kulesza, ‘Glosa do wyroku Sądu Najwyższego z dnia 17 stycznia 2013 r., sygn. V KK 99/12’ https://www.gov.pl/attachment/8c803dbd-34f4-4cc4-a4a9-c6e4dba03071 (accessed: 09.11.2026). ↩
  23. Ustawa z dnia 10 czerwca 2016 r. o działaniach antyterrorystycznych (t.j. Dz.U. 2024 poz. 92). ↩
  24. McCann and Others v the United Kingdom App no 18984/91 (ECtHR [GC], 27 September 1995) Series A no 324, paras 148–150, 161. ↩
  25. ‘Komunikat: stopnie alarmowe CHARLIE, BRAVO oraz BRAVO-CRP do 30 listopada’ (Urząd Miasta Krakowa, 2026) https://www.krakow.pl/aktualnosci/301026,29,komunikat,stopnie_alarmowe_charlie__bravo_oraz_bravo-crp_do_30_listopada.html (accessed: 09.11.2026). ↩
  26. Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r. (Dz.U. 1997 nr 78 poz. 483 ze zm.). ↩
  27. Najwyższa Izba Kontroli, Reglamentacja dostępu do broni palnej. Informacja o wynikach kontroli (P/25/089, nr ewid. 89/2025/P/25/089/LZG, 2026) 31, 53 https://www.nik.gov.pl/kontrole/wyniki-kontroli-nik/pobierz,lzg~r_24_002_202502061136261738838186~01,typ,kk.pdf (accessed: 09.11.2026). ↩
  28. Poselski projekt ustawy o zmianie ustawy o broni i amunicji, druk nr 1931 (Sejm RP X kadencji, 19 września 2025 r.), uzasadnienie https://api.sejm.gov.pl/sejm/term10/prints/1931/1931.pdf (accessed: 09.11.2026). ↩
  29. Sejm RP X kadencji, 26. posiedzenie, 2. dzień (9 stycznia 2025 r.), wypowiedź posłanki E Szymanowskiej https://api.sejm.gov.pl/sejm/term10/proceedings/26/2025-01-09/transcripts/138 (accessed: 09.11.2026). ↩
  30. Directive (EU) 2021/555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 March 2021 on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons (codification) [2021] OJ L115/1. ↩
  31. Wyrok Naczelnego Sądu Administracyjnego z dnia 13 marca 2008 r., II OSK 141/07 (cyt. za: ‘Kiedy można cofnąć pozwolenie na broń?’ (e-prawnik.pl) https://e-prawnik.pl/temat/kiedy-mozna-cofnac-pozwolenie-na-bron.html (accessed: 09.11.2026)). ↩
  32. Kotilainen and Others v Finland App no 62439/12 (ECtHR, 17 September 2020), para 85. ↩
  33. Loi n° 55-385 du 3 avril 1955 relative à l’état d’urgence, modifiée par la loi n° 2015-1501 du 20 novembre 2015. ↩
  34. Code de la sécurité intérieure (France) arts L. 226-1 – L. 229-1, L. 435-1 (dans la rédaction issue des lois n° 2017-258 du 28 février 2017 et n° 2017-1510 du 30 octobre 2017). ↩
  35. Loi du 8 juin 2006 réglant des activités économiques et individuelles avec des armes (Moniteur belge, 9 juin 2006). ↩
  36. Loi du 27 avril 2016 relative à des mesures complémentaires en matière de lutte contre le terrorisme; zob.: Chambre des représentants de Belgique, DOC 54 1951/003, 2 https://www.dekamer.be/FLWB/PDF/54/1951/54K1951003.pdf (accessed: 09.11.2026). ↩
  37. HR 20 september 2019, ECLI:NL:HR:2019:1409; Kamerstukken II 2019/20, 33 033, nr. 23, 1–2 https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-33033-23.pdf (accessed: 09.11.2026). ↩
  38. van der Kooij (przyp. 10) 54. ↩
  39. Drittes Gesetz zur Änderung des Waffengesetzes und weiterer Vorschriften (Drittes Waffenrechtsänderungsgesetz – 3. WaffRÄndG) vom 17. Februar 2020 (BGBl. I 2020 S. 166). ↩
  40. Chałupka (przyp. 5) 105. ↩
  41. Wyrok Trybunału Konstytucyjnego z dnia 30 lipca 2014 r., K 23/11, OTK-A 2014, nr 7, poz. 80. ↩
  42. Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich, komunikat w sprawie wykonania wyroku TK K 23/11 (Biuletyn Informacji Publicznej RPO) https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/pl/node/25793/revisions/27859/view (accessed: 09.11.2026). ↩
  43. Pietrzak and Bychawska-Siniarska and Others v Poland App nos 72038/17 and 25237/18 (ECtHR, 28 May 2024); w odniesieniu do art. 9 u.d.a. zob. para 54. ↩
  44. Ilnicki (przyp. 7) 61. ↩
  45. McCann and Others v the United Kingdom (przyp. 24) para 150. ↩
  46. Wasilewska and Kałucka v Poland App nos 28975/04 and 33406/04 (ECtHR, 23 February 2010), paras 49–58. ↩
  47. ‘Zastępca szefa KGP: poziom wakatów w Policji spadł poniżej 9 proc.’ (PAP, 2026) https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/zastepca-szefa-kgp-poziom-wakatow-w-policji-spadl-ponizej-9-proc (accessed: 09.11.2026). ↩
  48. ‘Modernizacja służb mundurowych 2026–2029: 13 mld zł na etaty, sprzęt, komendy’ (Prawo.pl) https://www.prawo.pl/samorzad/modernizacja-sluzb-mundurowych-20262029-13-mld-zl-na-etaty-sprzet-komendy,535487.html (accessed: 09.11.2026). ↩
  49. Ustawa z dnia 12 lipca 2024 r. o zmianie niektórych ustaw w celu usprawnienia działań Sił Zbrojnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Policji oraz Straży Granicznej na wypadek zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa państwa (Dz.U. 2024 poz. 1248). ↩
  50. Jakubiak (przyp. 6) 21. ↩

Bibliography

Journal articles

  1. Chałupka K, ‘Pozwolenie na posiadanie broni palnej – uwagi de lege lata i de lege ferenda’ (2014) 32 Nowa Kodyfikacja Prawa Karnego 103 (in Polish).
  2. Ilnicki M, ‘Użycie broni palnej jako szczególna forma egzekwowania przestrzegania prawa w pokojowych warunkach funkcjonowania państwa’ (2020) 4(140) Przegląd Policyjny 59 (in Polish).
  3. Jakubiak K, ‘Materialne przesłanki wydania pozwolenia na broń do celów ochrony osobistej’ (2025) 2 Policja 19 (in Polish).
  4. Jałoszyński K, ‘Strzał ratunkowy – rozwiązanie sytuacji zakładniczej w działaniach policyjnych’ (2012) 10 Kultura Bezpieczeństwa. Nauka – Praktyka – Refleksje 31 (in Polish).
  5. Kooij DA van der, ‘Toerekening van schade na “Groningen” en “Alphen aan den Rijn”’ (2021) 2 Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Burgerlijk Recht 54 (in Dutch).

Case notes

  1. Kulesza J, ‘Glosa do wyroku Sądu Najwyższego z dnia 17 stycznia 2013 r., sygn. V KK 99/12’ https://www.gov.pl/attachment/8c803dbd-34f4-4cc4-a4a9-c6e4dba03071 (accessed: 09.11.2026) (in Polish).

Reports

  1. Burdziak K, Definicja przestępstwa o charakterze terrorystycznym przewidziana w polskim Kodeksie karnym w świetle rozwiązań Unii Europejskiej, Rady Europy i Organizacji Narodów Zjednoczonych. Raport z projektu badawczego (Instytut Wymiaru Sprawiedliwości 2021) (in Polish).
  2. Najwyższa Izba Kontroli, Reglamentacja dostępu do broni palnej. Informacja o wynikach kontroli (2026) (in Polish).

Newspaper articles and websites

  1. ‘Dostęp do broni pod lupą MSWiA. Resort zapowiada przegląd po tragedii w Krakowie’ (InfoSecurity24, 2026) (in Polish).
  2. ‘Milion sztuk broni w rękach cywilów. Krakowska tragedia stawia pytania o system pozwoleń’ (Euronews, 9 November 2026) (in Polish).
  3. ‘Modernizacja służb mundurowych 2026–2029: 13 mld zł na etaty, sprzęt, komendy’ (Prawo.pl) (in Polish).
  4. ‘Nieoficjalne ustalenia o sprawcy zamachu w Krakowie. Wiadomo, kim jest Michał O.’ (Polskie Radio 24, 2026) (in Polish).
  5. ‘Rusza śledztwo w sprawie ataku w Krakowie’ (Interia, 2026) (in Polish).
  6. ‘Strzelanina na Rynku Głównym w Krakowie. Są zabici i ranni’ (RMF24, 7 November 2026) (in Polish).
  7. ‘Zastępca szefa KGP: poziom wakatów w Policji spadł poniżej 9 proc.’ (PAP, 2026) (in Polish).

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